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ABSTRACT 
During a hurricane, an individual’s risk perception does not remain static. Spatial 
and temporal variations of a hurricane will shift perceptions of risk, and complicating this 
dynamic are information-seeking processes increasingly reliant on the individual’s self-
motivated interpretation of information sources. Initial evacuation resistance or willingness 
could change even after evacuations are ordered, affecting evacuation preferences and 
departure times. Because Hurricane Matthew’s continually shifting track had virtually 
nonstop coverage, evacuation decisions were also being modified as residents either grew 
more or less certain of their safety. 
This research investigates the evacuation behaviors associated with Hurricane 
Matthew in October of 2016. It assesses the relationships between selected variables 
acquired from an online survey and evacuation departure times – generally speaking, the 
differences in evacuation behaviors between Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina survey 
respondents. Descriptive statistics are provided for several variables of interest, followed 
by spatiotemporal analysis of evacuation departures using Esri ArcGIS® software’s space-
time pattern mining tools. To assess the relationship of a subset of variables and evacuation 
during the entire study period (5 days), a binary logit model is estimated, and subsequently, 
to investigate the relationship of several variables and evacuation by day, four additional 
binary logit models are estimated and discussed. 
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 Results indicate that approximately 62% of the Florida sample, 77% of the Georgia 
sample, and 67% of the South Carolina sample evacuated. Under the logistic model 
analyzing the overall time period, an observed evacuation depended on not having prior 
hurricane experience, having received an evacuation order, an increased level of 
communication about the evacuation order, believing one lived in an evacuation zone, not 
knowing if one lived in an evacuation zone, having fewer pets in the household, and higher 
household income in 2015. However, the state (FL, GA, SC) was the only variable which 
was significant for each of the four days’ logistic regressions. Essentially, for each day, 
there were consistent differences in evacuation between the states. 
 Some of the results concerning the influence of some variables on evacuation behavior 
have been confirmed in past research, while others continue to emphasize the case-specific 
nature of every hurricane event through inconsistently influential variables. The descriptive 
results provided makes clear that a number of variables are taken into consideration in a 
household’s decision to evacuate, but the results from the subsequent analyses highlights 
that an authoritative evacuation order is the primary triggering variable. The results also 
show the significance of the state variable on coordinating an evacuation at the household 
level, which stresses the criticality of recommending protective action in a timely manner. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 The 2016 Atlantic hurricane season began with the anomalous mid-January 
Hurricane Alex and closed with the late-November Atlantic-Pacific Hurricane Otto. For 
the Southeastern coastal regions of the United States, Hurricane Matthew (September 28 – 
October 9 2016) presented the final direct impact from the 2016 hurricanes. Matthew 
became a tropical storm on September 28, west northwest of Barbados; it developed into a 
category 5 storm in the Caribbean making it the strongest Atlantic storm of the 2016 season, 
and also the deadliest (Stewart, 2016). In the U.S, Matthew’s path severely impacted the 
eastern coasts of Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina, while heavy rain 
and wind brought about flooding and wind damage in the interior parts of these states. 
Some models showed Matthew threatening to make direct landfall at various points along 
the southeast coast while others showed the storm moving parallel to the coastline. These 
forecasts constantly updated as Matthew continued along its track. When the western half 
of Matthew was over Cape Canaveral, FL, for example, it was a category 3 hurricane. 
While the storm moved north, parallel to the coastline, it continued to weaken and finally 
made U.S landfall as a category 1 hurricane near McClellanville, SC (Stewart, 2016), near 
where Hurricane Hugo made landfall in 1989. Approximately 1-4 days before the hurricane 
was projected to begin seriously impacting Florida, Georgia, and the Carolinas, the 
Governors of these states ordered evacuations for multiple counties along the coasts. 
 There are numerous variables involved in an individual’s or household’s evacuation 
decision-making process. Hurricane Matthew’s actual path and timeline, shifting projected 
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tracks and strengths, and broader spatial and temporal contexts illustrates the spatial and 
temporal differences in the evacuation behaviors along the eastern coasts of Florida, 
Georgia, and South Carolina. The ongoing coverage of Matthew’s continually shifting 
track meant individual and household decisions to evacuate or remain were also being 
continuously updated, thereby affecting evacuation departure times. As such, Hurricane 
Matthew presents an interesting case for analyzing the spatiotemporal stages and variables 
affecting the hurricane evacuation decision-making process.   
 This research aims to identify and analyze the most significant variables that drove 
the spatial and temporal patterns of evacuation behaviors during Hurricane Matthew in 
October 2016. 
Research Question 1: Were there any spatial and temporal differences in the Hurricane 
Matthew evacuation behaviors (e.g. compliance, departure times, destination) along the 
eastern coasts of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina?  
Research Question 2: If so, a) what were the differences, and b) are there individual 
and/or household-level variables that could explain such variations, especially in the 
amount of time between warning issuance and the initiation of protective action?  
 This thesis is comprised of five chapters. Chapter 2 details the hurricane evacuation 
literature and the existing research on variables influencing evacuation behavior and 
decision-making processes, as well as the significance of departure timing and household 
evacuation preferences. Chapter 3 discusses the data and methodologies used, including a 
description of the study area and survey, the method used to spatially analyze differences 
in departure times, and the setup of five binary logistic regression models. Following, 
Chapter 4 provides the results of the survey, comprising descriptive results, results of the 
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space-time analysis, and results of statistical tests and logit models. Chapter 5 discusses 
the results and supplies some qualitative data, not only to buttress the results of the 
regressions but enhance and provide another dimension of the survey respondents’ 
experiences, which statistical results do not convey.
 4 
CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Consensus on Variables Influencing Evacuation Behavior 
 Because variables and responses change from one storm to the next, there is 
extensive literature on hurricane evacuation behaviors dating back decades (Baker 1991; 
Bowser and Cutter 2015; Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016a). The influence of the work of 
Baker (1991) helped lay a foundation for a variety of research work concerning the driving 
variables behind hurricane evacuation behaviors. In his 1991 analyses of hurricane 
evacuation behaviors and variables of survey respondents for twelve hurricanes in a variety 
of geographic locations within the Southeastern United States, he found that, among 
numerous other factors, the differences in evacuation behaviors were generally explained 
by the individual’s perception of risk, or the held beliefs of the hazardousness of an area. 
Later research confirmed the importance of storm-specific physical factors in an 
individual’s decision to evacuate or remain (e.g. Dow and Cutter 1998; Whitehead et al. 
2000; Smith and McCarty 2009; Stein, Dueñas-Osorio, and Subramanian 2010; Bowser 
and Cutter 2015).  
 Much of the literature confirms the significance of recommendations of protective 
actions from public officials in prompting evacuations (Whitehead et al. 2000; Dow and 
Cutter 1998; Stein, Dueñas-Osorio, and Subramanian 2010; Bowser and Cutter 2015; 
Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016a). In other words, authoritative evacuation   
recommendations positively affect evacuation behaviors. Huang et al.’s (2016) statistical 
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meta-analysis of over 49 actual and hypothetical evacuation studies since Baker’s (1991) 
analyses enhanced the current understanding that local officials are, indeed, vital and 
influential sources of information in evacuation decision-making at the household level, 
and that an official warning is consistently positively correlated with evacuations. 
 Several other variables are consistent in terms of their significance on evacuation 
behaviors, such as private vehicle ownership for traveling to a variety of sheltering options, 
and the type of housing of a resident (Baker 1991; Dow and Cutter 1998; Smith and 
McCarty 2009; Lindell, Kang, and Prater 2011; Bowser and Cutter 2015; Huang, Lindell, 
and Prater 2016a). Bearing weak, inconsistent, or no direct significance on hurricane 
evacuation behaviors are some demographic factors, like age, gender, or race; previous 
hurricane experience; exposure to previous false alarms; and previous participation in 
shadow evacuations (Baker 1991; Dow and Cutter 1998; Whitehead et al. 2000; Arlikatti 
2006; Smith and McCarty 2009; Stein, Dueñas-Osorio, and Subramanian 2010; Lindell, 
Kang, and Prater 2011; Bowser and Cutter 2015; Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016a; Huang, 
Lindell, and Prater 2016b). Even general hurricane awareness, such as knowing where one 
is in relation to risk area, is inconsistent – Zhang et al. (2004) and Arlikatti et al. (2006) 
conducted studies of Texas coastal residents and found different proportions of respondents 
were able to correctly identify their risk areas on provided maps, but correct identification 
of risk area was found to be uncorrelated with evacuation expectations. However, an 
individual’s perception of risk could very well be mediated by, or interact with, some of 
these more inconsistently correlated variables (Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016b). 
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2.2 Consensus on Variables Influencing the Decision-Making Process 
 While the reception of official warnings and storm-specific physical factors 
consistently and significantly influence evacuation behaviors, people must seek out this 
information or acquire these data through various channels before ultimately making a 
decision (DeYoung et al. 2016; Bowser and Cutter 2015). Therefore, when studying 
evacuation behaviors it is also important to look at the decision-making process: the 
consumption of information, social interactions and cues, and the decision that follows 
such processes. Updated communication technologies change the modalities of 
information consumption. During a hurricane’s approach, another facet of evacuation 
processes is information-seeking and “milling” (Mileti and Peek 2000; Eiser et al. 2012); 
that is, more information on the hurricane is both disseminated and sought out. The 
“milling” process is evolving with the proliferation of web-based information outlets and 
social media, although the manner in which it may be affecting evacuation behaviors is as 
yet unclear (Bowser and Cutter 2015). Seeking information fills gaps in knowledge, but 
also confirms what is already thought to be known, furthering independence in decision-
making. This independence may suggest a smaller dependence on official advice; although 
official recommendations for evacuating are very much a significant influence on the 
individual’s final decision to evacuate or remain, it is prudent to consider it as one piece of 
information considered in the decision-making process. 
 People seek information on storm-specific characteristics, and those characteristics 
correlate with decisions to evacuate or remain in an area (Huang, Lindell, and Prater 
2016a). A risk-communication disconnect with regards to layperson interpretation of 
knowledge products presents a challenge. If the interpretation of the information is faulty, 
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perhaps the most appropriate actions would not be undertaken by the individual. For 
instance, during Florida’s 2004 hurricane season, with landfalling hurricanes Charley, 
Frances, Ivan, and Jeanne, the black track line within the cone of uncertainty became the 
primary focus for many, while others interpreted the boundaries of the cone of uncertainty 
to signify the area of danger (Broad et al. 2007). This is an important finding to consider 
when Hurricane Charley’s track shifted and brought the hurricane to Cayo Costa near Fort 
Meyers and Punta Gorda – well within the cone of uncertainty, but not the target of the 
black track line (Pasch, Brown, and Blake 2004; National Weather Service 2006). People 
in those areas were largely caught unprepared, even when watches and warnings were 
disseminated at least 23 hours before landfall (National Weather Service 2006), 
demonstrating the significance of individual and/or household-level information-seeking 
and interpretation when making the decision to evacuate or remain. 
 An additional consideration when studying hurricane evacuation behaviors and 
information-seeking is the dynamic nature of the landscapes in which populations operate, 
since the behaviors may not remain static. Demographics of study areas should also be 
considered, since an area with low residential turnover rates could respond to hurricanes in 
different ways compared to an area with a large transient population. A longer residency 
in an area could lend itself to a higher likelihood of prior hurricane experience, which could 
lead to different evacuation behaviors when compared to areas which have a greater 
number of new incoming residents who may have no prior hurricane experience (Kang, 
Lindell, and Prater 2007). On the other hand, and largely missing from evacuation literature 
are analyses of important subgroups like transient populations (Lindell, Kang, and Prater 
2011; Bowser and Cutter 2015). A recent piece of research that may shed some light on 
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this matter is a survey conducted by Cahyanto et al. (2016). The study of Florida tourists 
revealed that a lack of hurricane knowledge, due to tourists’ inherent transience, increased 
the likelihood of information-seeking processes (Cahyanto et al. 2016). Increased 
information-seeking from a potentially vulnerable subgroup such as tourists, who may not 
have an established social network in the place they visit, would emphasize the need for 
clear and easy-to-interpret hurricane knowledge materials. Thus, while seemingly 
tangential to actual evacuation processes, it is also important to look at information-
seeking, knowledge-confirmation processes, and the subsequent translation into action or 
non-action when studying evacuation behaviors. 
 
2.3 Departure Timing and Evacuation Preferences 
Not only is it important to assess who evacuates and why, but also who evacuates 
and why they do it when they do, as well as how they do it. While much of the hurricane 
evacuation literature may address the variables that influence the decision-making process 
and the subsequent choice to evacuate or remain, there seems to be less certainty in terms 
of the human factors that influence the variability in hurricane evacuation timing. Studies 
on evacuation timing often assume full evacuation compliance, no processes of shadow 
evacuation, various vehicle occupancies, natural and even dispersion on evacuation routes 
(Lindell and Prater 2007), or simultaneous evacuations (Sbayti and Mahmassani 2006). 
Other studies focus on infrastructural or network problems with little regard to the 
behavioral aspects that play a significant role in the departure timing and evacuation 
preferences of an individual or household (Pel, Hoogendoorn, and Bliemer 2010). 
However, there are a few exceptions, for example, a study on Hurricane Ivan evacuation 
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dynamics investigates physical and demographic variables contributing to household 
decisions to evacuate, and decisions on when to leave (Sarwar et al. 2016).  
The common assumptions in many evacuation timing studies may run counter to 
actual occurrences, such as the evacuation process during Hurricane Floyd in 1999. Dow 
and Cutter (2002) analyzed some of the main contributors to the severe traffic problems 
encountered during the evacuation from the hurricane. The intense congestion which 
manifested on major interstates in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina was partially due 
to the intensity and forecasted path(s) of Hurricane Floyd, prompting calls for evacuations 
in all three states. In South Carolina, the congestion was also a result of about half of the 
evacuees departing in the same 6-hour window, about a quarter of the evacuees taking more 
than one vehicle, and most traveling further than necessary to ensure safety (Dow and 
Cutter 2002). 
Further, Mileti and Sorensen (2015) postulate a lag time – the Protective Action 
Initiation Time – between when warnings are issued and when residents begin to take 
protective actions such as evacuation (Figure 2.1).  The lag time exists because of the need 
to take preparatory actions, such as making accommodations elsewhere, compounded by, 
for instance, the presence of pets, children, elderly family members, or those with physical 
ailments, but some of it is also a function of residents seeking confirmatory information on 
the nature of the threat, clarity of the warnings, the time of day the warning is received, 
length of residency in the area, or yet other reasons (Mileti and Peek 2000; Lindell and 
Prater 2007; Dixit et al. 2012; Mileti and Sorensen 2015). However, the delay does not 
occur for all residents who do decide to evacuate, as some residents choose to leave before 
an official warning or evacuation order has been mandated for their area, depending on 
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their interpretation of storm threats or expectation of related issues, such as traffic 
congestion. It is therefore necessary to examine whether household characteristics partially 
explain differences in evacuation, not only with regards to compliance, but also evacuation 
preferences and departure timing. 
The research questions concern the existence of any spatial and temporal 
differences in evacuation behaviors during Hurricane Matthew, pinpointing what the 
differences actually were, and if there are household-level variables that could explain the 
differences, especially time of departure, akin to the study conducted by Sarwar et al. 2016. 
While this thesis does not attempt to fully model evacuation behaviors, because every 
hurricane and evacuation response is different from one event to the next, this thesis does 
build on and attempts to contribute to existing hurricane evacuation literature by taking 
into account variables that influence evacuation, decision-making, and timing of household 
evacuation.
Figure 2.1 Timeline of warning issuance and initiation of protective  
action. 
 
Source: Mileti and Sorensen, 2015: 2. A Guide to Public Alerts and 
Warnings for Dam and Levee Emergencies, Davis, CA: USACE. URL: 
https://silverjackets.nfrmp.us/Portals/0/doc/WarningGuidebook_USA
CE.pdf?ver=2015-08-10-213008-520 
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CHAPTER THREE: DATA AND METHODOLOGIES 
3.1 Study Area 
 The Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute (HVRI) in the Department of 
Geography at the University of South Carolina, and HVRI affiliates (Dr.’s Christopher 
Emrich and Jamie Mitchem) at the University of Central Florida and University of North 
Georgia, respectively, collaborated to study coastal residents’ evacuation responses to 
Hurricane Matthew along the eastern coast of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, which 
became the study area, due to the context of the storm. To elaborate, hurricane watches and 
warnings were put in place along the coast of the study area as Hurricane Matthew 
advanced. Appendix A details NHC advisories 26 through 43, as they were the advisories 
with the first and last watch or warning of the study areas. The first watch occurred on 
Tuesday, October 4th; the first warning occurred on Wednesday, October 5th, in Florida. 
The last warning and watch were in place for parts of South and North Carolina. 
Additionally, because of the intensity of the hurricane and the continued threat presented 
by it, multiple evacuations were ordered for coastal residents in all three states. 
 
3.2 Official Recommendations for Protective Action 
 Voluntary and mandatory evacuations were recommended or ordered by multiple 
county officials along the Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina coasts. Table 3.1 shows 
only the recommendations or orders for the study area. However, there were more 
evacuation orders disseminated by other counties than what is shown in the table.  These 
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data were collected long after Hurricane Matthew occurred, from state government or 
emergency management websites, or online news media articles. Typically, original times 
of the orders are not published, and instead, the article or posting might have only the date 
or an update time (where the original post time is removed or overwritten). Because of this, 
the dates and times of the orders are approximate and only serve to provide the “big picture” 
of how the Hurricane Matthew evacuation played out. In general, of the three states, South 
Carolina coastal residents received the first notice on Tuesday, October 4th, of a mandatory 
evacuation to begin Wednesday, October 5th. Florida coastal residents began receiving 
orders on Wednesday, October 5th, while Georgia coastal residents began receiving orders 
on Thursday, October 6th.  
Table 3.1  Evacuation recommendations/orders and times for FL, GA, and SC coastal 
counties 
STATE COUNTY LOCATIONS / 
ZONES 
TYPE DATE ORDERED 
(NOTES) 
FL Brevard1,2 Barrier islands Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3:00 
PM, 10/5) 
FL Duval1,3 A Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as 
voluntary) 
FL Duval1,3 B Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as 
voluntary) 
FL Duval1,3 C Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as 
voluntary) 
FL Flagler1 A Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as 
voluntary 10/5, mandatory 
by 10/6) 
FL Flagler1 B Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Began as 
voluntary 10/5, mandatory 
by 10/6) 
FL Indian 
River2 
Barrier islands, 
mobile homes, 
low-lying areas 
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at 
8:00 AM 10/6 as 
mandatory; began as 
voluntary 10/5) 
FL Martin2 Sewall's Point Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Have begun) 
FL Martin2 Hutchinson Island Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Have begun) 
FL Martin2 Jupiter Island Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Have begun) 
FL Martin2 Mobile homes Mandatory 10/5/2016 (Have begun) 
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FL Nassau2 A Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at 
6:00 AM) 
FL Nassau2 C Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at 
6:00 AM) 
FL Nassau2 F Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at 
6:00 AM) 
FL Palm Beach2 A Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 10/5) 
FL Palm Beach2 B Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 10/5) 
FL St Johns2 A Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at 
6:00 AM 10/6 as 
mandatory; began as 
voluntary 10/5) 
FL St Johns2 B Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at 
6:00 AM 10/6 as 
mandatory; began as 
voluntary 10/5) 
FL St Johns2 F Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at 
6:00 AM 10/6 as 
mandatory; began as 
voluntary 10/5) 
FL St Lucie1,2 Barrier islands, 
low-lying areas 
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin 10/6 
as mandatory; began as 
voluntary 10/5) 
FL St Lucie1 East of U.S. 1 Voluntary 10/5/2016 (Have begun) 
FL Volusia2 Beachside, low-
lying areas, RVs, 
mobile homes 
Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin at 
6:00 AM 10/6 as 
mandatory; began as 
voluntary 10/5) 
GA Bryan4 East of I-95 Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning) 
GA Camden4 East of I-95 Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning) 
GA Chatham4 East of I-95 Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning) 
GA Glynn4 East of I-95 Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning) 
GA Liberty4 East of I-95 Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning) 
GA McIntosh4 East of I-95 Mandatory 10/6/2016 (Morning) 
GA Above 
counties4 
West of I-95 Voluntary 10/6/2016 (Morning) 
SC Beaufort5 A Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Berkeley5 B Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Berkeley5 G Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Charleston5 A Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Charleston5 B Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Charleston5 C Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Colleton5 A Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
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SC Colleton7 B Mandatory 10/6/2016 (“Effective 
immediately” 10/6) 
SC Dorchester5 B Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Dorchester5 D Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Dorchester5 E Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Dorchester5 F Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Georgetown
6 
A Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin 12:00 
PM) 
SC Horry6 A Mandatory 10/6/2016 (To begin 12:00 
PM) 
SC Jasper5 A Mandatory 10/5/2016 (To begin 3 PM) 
SC Jasper7 B Mandatory 10/6/2016 ("Effective 
immediately" 10/6) 
1. https://www.flgov.com/2016/10/05/47411/ 
2. https://www.flgov.com/2016/10/05/gov-scott-issues-updates-on-hurricane-
matthew-preparedness-efforts-as-storm-approaches-florida-3/ 
3. https://www.wokv.com/news/local/county-county-
evacuations/EZPRnwk5crlzzmXQRVIsjJ/ 
4. https://www.wsbtv.com/news/local/atlanta/hurricane-matthew-strengthens-as-it-
approaches-florida/454047157 
5. http://scemd.org/component/content/article/11-home-page/news/240-matthew-
news-release-4 
6. http://scemd.org/component/content/article/11-home-page/news/245-matthew-
news-release-8 
7. http://scemd.org/component/content/article/11-home-page/news/247-matthew-
news-release-9 
 
3.3 Survey Method 
 Following previous, standard post-hurricane assessment surveys, HVRI and HVRI 
affiliates (Dr. Christopher Emrich at University of Central Florida and Dr. Jamie Mitchem 
at University of North Georgia) mailed a total of over 45,000 postcards to coastal residents 
in select Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina counties (Figure 3.1). North Carolina was 
omitted from the study area due to lack of resources, and storm track and strength (Figure 
3.2). Random addresses were provided by Infogroup®, a data analytics services provider. 
The postcards provided a link to an online survey platform provided by SurveyMonkey®. 
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Figure 3.1  Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina coastal counties from which 
addresses were randomly selected to receive the hurricane evacuation survey. 
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 The survey instrument itself consisted of standard, behavioral hurricane evacuation  
questions pertaining to topics like prior experience, risk area awareness, information 
sources, influences on behavior, and general demographic questions (see Appendix B). The 
delivery method (i.e. online survey) was thought to provide a quicker approach to assessing 
responses, namely in the minimized data entry (i.e. from handwritten survey response to 
digital copy for statistical analysis) and costs (e.g. less paper and less mail weight). 
However, it could have contributed to the low response rate (less than 2%), as web-based 
surveys fairly consistently provide low numbers of respondents (Leece et al. 2004; Fan and 
Figure 3.2 Coastal counties from which addresses were selected. NHC Best Track 
(color) and NHC 5-day Forecast Line and Cone for Advisory 22 (first mention of 
Florida) for Matthew displayed east of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina coastline. 
Shapefiles downloaded from NHC. 
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Yan 2010), and on top of this, survey response rates appear to be decreasing over time 
(Cull et al. 2005; Johnson and Wislar 2012). Further, the survey was accessible from 
November to mid-December 2016, and influences such as the political and holiday season 
during this time period may have also contributed to the low response rate. 
 The total sample size of n=697 breaks down as follows: FL n=225; GA n=159; SC 
n=313. Table 3.2 provides an overview of the total responses received and the response 
rates, with corresponding confidence intervals. Those who supplied a departure time sum 
to an n=465 out of a total evacuation group of n=472 (in other words, several respondents 
evacuated but did not provide us with a time of departure). Permission was granted to use 
the survey data from Florida and Georgia, and all the returned survey data from FL, GA, 
and SC were coded, standardized and consolidated for use in the analyses.  
Table 3.2 Response Rates and Confidence 
  Overall Florida Georgia South 
Carolina 
Postcards delivered 48,347 18,240 10,278 19,829 
Responses received 735 238 168 329 
Response rate (%) 1.52 1.30 1.63 1.66 
Responses used 697 225 159 313 
Total population in study area  3,814,112  2,375,637  465,135  973,340 
Confidence interval of all 
responses received 
 ± 3.61  ± 6.35  ± 7.56  ± 5.40 
 
3.4 Space-Time Cube and Emerging Hot Spot Analysis 
 To help address RQ1 regarding spatial and temporal differences in evacuation 
behaviors, Esri ArcGIS® software’s space-time pattern mining tools (Create Space-Time 
Cube and Emerging Hot Spot Analysis) were used. Creating a Space-Time Cube 
aggregates a set of points into space-time bins, in which the points are counted; in essence, 
the trends are non-spatially assessed via the Mann-Kendall trend test, which analyzes data 
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to determine if there is any upward or downward trend in the variable over time. The 
Emerging Hot Spot Analysis tool detects and evaluates trends (Table 3.3) over time by 
calculating the Getis-Ord Gi* statistic for each bin (Esri, Inc. 2016a; Esri, Inc. 2016b). The 
respondent locations were used as the point data, and each respondent has an associated 
departure value (date/time). The times provided to the survey respondent were in intervals, 
so for the purposes of this analysis, the midpoint of every interval was used as the 
timestamp. For example, if a respondent reported having left on Wednesday, October 5 
between 6 AM and noon, the departure value would be 10/05/2016 09:00:00 AM. The 
points were stratified by state before using the tool, and each space-time bin distance 
interval was specified to 15 kilometers by 15 kilometers, and time intervals set to 6 hours. 
Table 3.3 How Esri ArcGIS software’s Emerging Hot Spot Analysis tool 
categorizes each study area location.  
Pattern Name Definition 
No Pattern Detected 
Does not fall into any of the hot or cold spot patterns 
defined below. 
New Hot Spot 
A location that is a statistically significant hot spot for 
the final time step and has never been a statistically 
significant hot spot before. 
Consecutive Hot 
Spot 
A location with a single uninterrupted run of 
statistically significant hot spot bins in the final time-
step intervals. The location has never been a 
statistically significant hot spot prior to the final hot 
spot run and less than ninety percent of all bins are 
statistically significant hot spots. 
Intensifying Hot 
Spot 
A location that has been a statistically significant hot 
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals, 
including the final time step. In addition, the intensity 
of clustering of high counts in each time step is 
increasing overall and that increase is statistically 
significant. 
Persistent Hot Spot 
A location that has been a statistically significant hot 
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals with 
no discernible trend indicating an increase or decrease 
in the intensity of clustering over time. 
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Diminishing Hot 
Spot 
A location that has been a statistically significant hot 
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals, 
including the final time step. In addition, the intensity 
of clustering in each time step is decreasing overall 
and that decrease is statistically significant. 
Sporadic Hot Spot 
A location that is an on-again then off-again hot spot. 
Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals have 
been statistically significant hot spots and none of the 
time-step intervals have been statistically significant 
cold spots. 
Oscillating Hot Spot 
A statistically significant hot spot for the final time-
step interval that has a history of also being a 
statistically significant cold spot during a prior time 
step. Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals 
have been statistically significant hot spots. 
Historical Hot Spot 
The most recent time period is not hot, but at least 
ninety percent of the time-step intervals have been 
statistically significant hot spots. 
New Cold Spot 
A location that is a statistically significant cold spot for 
the final time step and has never been a statistically 
significant cold spot before. 
Consecutive Cold 
Spot 
A location with a single uninterrupted run of 
statistically significant cold spot bins in the final time-
step intervals. The location has never been a 
statistically significant cold spot prior to the final cold 
spot run and less than ninety percent of all bins are 
statistically significant cold spots. 
Intensifying Cold 
Spot 
A location that has been a statistically significant cold 
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals, 
including the final time step. In addition, the intensity 
of clustering of low counts in each time step is 
increasing overall and that increase is statistically 
significant. 
Persistent Cold Spot 
A location that has been a statistically significant cold 
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals with 
no discernible trend, indicating an increase or decrease 
in the intensity of clustering of counts over time. 
Diminishing Cold 
Spot 
A location that has been a statistically significant cold 
spot for ninety percent of the time-step intervals, 
including the final time step. In addition, the intensity 
of clustering of low counts in each time step is 
decreasing overall and that decrease is statistically 
significant. 
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Sporadic Cold Spot 
A location that is an on-again then off-again cold spot. 
Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals have 
been statistically significant cold spots and none of the 
time-step intervals have been statistically significant 
hot spots. 
Oscillating Cold 
Spot 
A statistically significant cold spot for the final time-
step interval that has a history of also being a 
statistically significant hot spot during a prior time 
step. Less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals 
have been statistically significant cold spots. 
Historical Cold Spot 
The most recent time period is not cold, but at least 
ninety percent of the time-step intervals have been 
statistically significant cold spots. 
Source: Environmental Systems Research Institute, Inc. 2016. How Emerging 
Hot Spot Analysis works, Redlands, CA. URL: http://desktop.arcgis.com/en 
/arcmap/10.3/tools/space-time-pattern-mining-toolbox/learnmoreemerging.htm 
 
3.5 Binary Logit Models 
 To analyze the relationship between the binary response of evacuation/non-
evacuation and selected variables based on existing literature, binary logit models were 
estimated using SAS/SAT® software. The first models the probability of a household 
evacuating over the entire study period. Of the questions asked in the survey, there were 
originally 14 regressors (Table 3.4) selected for inclusion in the first model 
(MODEL_ALLDAYS) because of their potential to change the probability of a household 
evacuation. However, the data set with missing values presented significant limitations. 
Missing values (e.g. from respondent omission, purposeful or accidental) often present a 
problem in many analyses. Such incomplete cases are a challenge to deal with, and many 
default statistical procedures will deal with incomplete cases using listwise deletion. Other 
times, imputation of single values such as the mean can be carried out, but imputing one 
value for all empty values biases estimates (Little and Rubin 1987) as it disregards the 
uncertainty of the unknown values and should generally be avoided. In other cases, more 
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advanced imputation techniques using expectation maximization, or multiple imputation 
using simulated values are conducted to increase the number of usable (statistically valid) 
cases, reflecting the uncertainty of unknown values. The imputation method to be used 
depends on the pattern of missingness (i.e. monotone or arbitrary), the type of variable (i.e. 
continuous, ordinal, or nominal), and whether the data is parametric or non-parametric 
(Kang 2013).  
Table 3.4 Variables selected for inclusion in the overall logistic regression model. 
Variable Description Response Category 
STATE Dummy variable; states SC 
FL 
GA 
1 
2 
3 
PREEXP Dummy variable; whether the 
respondent has experienced a 
hurricane prior to Matthew 
No 
Yes 
0 
1 
EVACORDER Dummy variable; whether the 
respondent received an order to 
evacuate from hurricane Matthew 
No 
Yes 
0 
1 
WHOSCORE Sum of the number of types of 
evacuation-information sources the 
respondent used (e.g. police, 
media, governor, coworker, 
employer, etc.) 
See table 4.1 for 
specifics 
0-9 
HOWSCORE Sum of the number of types of 
evacuation-information modes the 
respondent used (e.g. social media, 
radio, TV, newspaper, face-to-face 
communication, etc.) 
See table 4.1 for 
specifics 
0-9 
TELLSCORE Sum of the number of types of 
people the respondent told about 
the evacuation order (e.g. 
neighbor, friend, coworker, 
employer, etc.) 
See table 4.1 for 
specifics 
0-6 
EVACZONE Dummy variable; if the respondent 
thinks they live in an evacuation 
zone 
No 
Yes 
Don’t know 
0 
1 
2 
FEMAZONE Dummy variable; if the respondent 
thinks they live in a FEMA-
designated flood zone 
No 
Yes 
Don’t know 
0 
1 
2 
NLIVHH Number of occupants in household Free response  
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 After paring down the variables to the ones thought to be of importance to the 
analysis (i.e. all 14 variables in Table 3.4), variables containing a large amount of missing 
data were then considered, and thought to be less essential to the analysis (the number of 
household members under 18 and over 65 years of age). Because much of the missing data 
came from these two items and were considered less essential to the analysis, these items 
were removed, and missing values were not imputed and were only dealt with using the 
default method of listwise deletion. Thus, for the first model, MODEL_ALLDAYS, 136 
observations were deleted due to missing values and only 561 of the 697 observations were 
used. If the two variables for the number of household members under 18 and over 65 were 
kept in the analysis, and listwise deletion was used to deal with missing values, 306 
observations would be deleted, and only 391 of the 697 observations would be used.  
 Essentially, the first logit model used the entire dataset with the 12 variables (i.e. 
the variables in Table 3.4, except for HHU18 and HHO65). Four design variables were 
created for STATE, PREEXP, EVACORDER, EVACZONE, and FEMAZONE (i.e. these 
were identified as the categorical variables in the logistic procedure), with reference 
(dummy) coding used to represent the class variables, and the last responses (e.g. “Yes” or 
“1”; “Don’t know” or “2”) being used as the reference categories. The data were not 
NAUTOHH Number of automobiles owned by 
household 
Free response  
NPETS Number of pets at household Free response  
HHINC2015 Household income in 2015 as 
ordinal variable (5 levels) 
Less than 22,000 
22,001 – 43,999 
44,000 – 65,999 
66,000 – 87,999 
88,000 or more 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
HHU18* Number in household under 18 Free response  
HHO65* Number in household over 65 Free response  
*Removed from variable list to solve missing values problem 
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separated into the days of the evacuation procedures, in order to understand which variables 
led to any evacuation at all during the time period. 
 For the purpose of the evacuation-day-based logistic regression analyses, the full 
data were used, stratified by day, to facilitate the estimation of four1 binary logit models, 
with each model corresponding to a day (MODELD1 – MODELD4). These regression 
analyses were conducted in order to assess the relationship between the binary response of 
evacuation (but on each day) and a group of variables selected based on existing literature. 
Of the questions asked in the survey, there were 9 regressors (Table 3.5) selected for 
inclusion in the model because of their potential to change the probability of a household 
evacuation in time interval t. The milling variables (WHOSCORE, HOWSCORE, and 
TELLSCORE) were removed to decrease the number of listwise-deleted observations. 
  
Table 3.5 Variables selected for inclusion in the four logistic regression models. 
Variable Description Response Category 
STATE Dummy variable; the order in which 
states first issued any evacuation 
order (SC-1; FL-2; GA-3) 
SC 
FL 
GA 
1 
2 
3 
PREEXP Dummy variable; whether the 
respondent has experienced a 
hurricane prior to Matthew (No-0; 
Yes-1) 
No 
Yes 
0 
1 
EVACORDER Dummy variable; whether the 
respondent received an order to 
evacuate from hurricane Matthew 
No 
Yes 
0 
1 
EVACZONE Dummy variable; whether the 
respondent knows they live in an 
evacuation zone 
No 
Yes 
Don’t know 
0 
1 
2 
FEMAZONE Dummy variable; whether the 
respondent knows they live in a 
FEMA-designated flood zone 
No 
Yes 
Don’t know 
0 
1 
2 
NLIVHH Number of occupants in household Free response  
                                                          
1Because only one respondent needed to evacuate on Saturday, October 8 due to flooding associated with 
Matthew, the maximum likelihood estimate does not exist for the fifth day’s logistic regression model and 
is thus invalid. 
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NAUTOHH Number of automobiles owned by 
household 
Free response  
NPETS Number of pets at household Free response  
HHINC2015 Household income in 2015 as 
ordinal variable (5 levels) 
Less than 22,000 
22,001 – 43,999 
44,000 – 65,999 
66,000 – 87,999 
88,000 or more 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
  
 For MODELD1-MODELD4, 82 of the 465 evacuee observations were deleted and 
only 383 observations were used in each of the four logistic regression models. STATE, 
PREEXP, EVACORDER, EVACZONE, and FEMAZONE were identified as the 
categorical variables in the logistic procedure, again with reference (i.e. dummy) coding 
and “yes”/”1” responses being used as the reference categories. Attempts were made to run 
the full logistic models including all nine variables, however, due to having a sparse 
dataset, quasi-complete or complete separation of data points was detected and the model 
convergence criterion were not always satisfied. Because of this, inferences about the 
parameters would have been invalid. Therefore, forward selection was used on the day-
based Matthew sub-datasets to identify the effects contributing to either an observation of 
evacuating or not evacuating. The significance level selected for entry into the model was 
0.15, to possibly include variables which have marginal evidence of changing the chance 
of an evacuation. To provide an idea of how the sample breaks down, simple descriptive 
results will be provided for select responses, but results from further analyses using Esri 
ArcGIS® software’s space-time pattern mining tools as well as tests and logistic models 
using SAS/STAT® software will follow. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESULTS 
4.1 Descriptive Results 
 Descriptive results indicate that 62.2% of the Florida sample (total FL n=225), 
76.7% of the Georgia sample (total n=155), and 67.1% of the South Carolina sample (total 
SC n=311) evacuated (Figure 4.1). Overall, 69.6% of Florida respondents, 90.6% of 
Georgia respondents, and 71.8% of South Carolina respondents said they received an 
evacuation order (Figure 4.2), but a simple overlay analysis in a GIS shows that 89% of 
our FL respondents, 100% of our GA respondents, and 84% of our SC respondents live in 
hurricane evacuation zones.  
 One interpretation of the discrepancies between the percentage of those who 
received the order to evacuate and the percentage of people who should have received an 
evacuation order based on their location in an evacuation zone could be that some residents 
were not aware of an evacuation order, so they think they did not receive one. However, it 
could also be due to not all evacuation zones being called to evacuate. In other words, in 
many coastal counties, sub-county evacuation zones are determined based on the location’s 
proximity to the coast and local topography. Typically, evacuations are called for all zones, 
or Zones A and B, or certain residents (e.g. those who live in mobile homes and low-lying 
areas) (refer back to Table 3.1 for study area specifics).
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Figure 4.1 Percentages of those who evacuated  
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Percentages of those who reported having received an 
evacuation order 
 
4.1.1 Evacuation Prompts 
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order (Figure 4.3 top), which essentially means some people evacuated without having 
received the order to do so. Of those who did not evacuate, 38.8% of Florida respondents, 
81.1% of Georgia respondents, and 46.1% of South Carolina respondents said they 
received an evacuation order (Figure 4.3 bottom). The respondents from Georgia had the 
highest percentage of people who did not or could not comply with the order. Because not 
all zones were called to evacuate, in Florida, 67% of our survey respondents who actually 
live in evacuation zones evacuated, and 24% who do not live in evacuation zones also 
evacuated. In Georgia, all respondents live in an evacuation zone and 76% of them reported 
having evacuated. In South Carolina, 73% of those who live in evacuation zones evacuated, 
and 31% who do not live in evacuation zones also evacuated.  
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Figure 4.3 (top) Percentages of those who reported having received an 
evacuation order, evacuation group (top); non-evacuation group (bottom) 
 
 
 Of the evacuation group, the survey asked what factors influenced the decision to 
evacuate (Figure 4.4). For Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina, the hurricane’s track was 
the primary motivator (78.6%, 75.4%, 71.4%, respectively), with marginal to no significant 
differences between the groups. The hurricane’s strength was an additional motivator for 
Florida (78.6%), and a secondary motivator for Georgia and South Carolina (73.0%, and 
57.1%, respectively) with strong evidence that the proportion of Florida respondents who 
cited hurricane strength as an influential factor in evacuating was greater than the 
proportion of South Carolina respondents (p=0), and strong evidence that the proportion of 
Georgia respondents who cited hurricane strength as an influential factor in deciding to 
evacuate was greater than the proportion of South Carolina residents (p=0.0018). The 
difference between FL and SC, and GA and SC, may be due to the shift in classification 
from “major hurricane” to simply “hurricane” along the Georgia coast. However, it is 
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unclear whether the interpretations of “hurricane strength” were in regards to flood/surge 
potential, wind potential, or both. The third-most respondent-cited motivating factor in 
evacuating for FL, GA, and SC, was receiving a mandatory evacuation order (55.7%, 
66.4%, and 55.7%, respectively). It is interesting to note the apparently tertiary influence 
of mandatory evacuation orders on evacuation behaviors, especially since the evacuation 
order times complement the departure times. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Factors influencing the decision to evacuate 
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4.1.2 Non-evacuation Prompts 
 Of the non-evacuation group, the survey asked what factors influenced the decision 
to remain and not evacuate (Figure 4.5). For Florida, the primary factor contributing to 
non-evacuation was the path of the hurricane (45%), followed by concern for property 
(40%) and the strength of the hurricane (36%). Georgia respondents cited both the strength 
and the track of the hurricane as primary factors for non-evacuation (65%), followed by 
traffic concerns (41%). In South Carolina, the main influence for staying was the strength 
(66%), followed by the path of the hurricane (47%), and concern for property (34%). With 
regards to only the storm-specific factors (i.e. strength and track of the hurricane), there is 
strong evidence that the proportion of Florida respondents who cited hurricane strength as 
an influence in staying was less than the proportion of Georgia respondents (p=0.0015), 
with a similar difference between Florida and South Carolina non-evacuees (p=0).  
  
 
Figure 4.5 Factors influencing the decision to not evacuate 
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 Additionally, there is strong evidence that the proportion of Georgia respondents 
who cited the hurricane’s track as an influential factor in the decision to remain was greater 
than the proportion of Florida respondents (p=0.0212), and also greater than that of South 
Carolina respondents (p=0.0301). Interestingly, with regards to citing the hurricane 
strength as a factor in not evacuating, there is no evidence of any significant difference 
between the proportions of respondents from Georgia and South Carolina, presumably due 
to the storm being classified as a non-major hurricane as it began its trek along the Georgia 
coastline. Concerning the hurricane track, there is no strong evidence of any difference 
between Florida and South Carolina, presumably due to the continued threat of landfall 
along the Florida coast, and the eventual landfall in South Carolina. This suggests that 
while 18 of the 22 NHC forecast uncertainty cones from Advisories #22 through #43 
included the Georgia coastline, interpretations may be focused on the center track line. 
These interpretations may be complicated by the slew of spaghetti models displayed by 
various media outlets and websites. 
 Besides residents reporting not living in an evacuation zone for which an order was 
called, some of the “other” (i.e. free response) responses were significant to note. A number 
of responses mentioned elderly family members or friends for whom it would be difficult 
to travel, physical disabilities of family or friends, infirmed family members or friends, or 
being unable to drive great distances due to age. A number of other responses mentioned 
the time it would take to be able to return home, being prepared to withstand hurricanes 
(e.g. structural home protection, owning generators, supplies, etc.), or receiving the 
evacuation order too late.  
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4.1.3 Travel Behaviors 
 Of those who did evacuate, South Carolina had the greatest percentage of people 
who evacuated to an out-of-state destination (56.9%, Figure 4.6). Disregarding the 
availability of accommodations, simply regarding safety from storm surge and coastal 
flooding, most coastal residents in a number of states would have to travel anywhere from 
10-50 miles inland. The higher percentage of people in South Carolina who traveled out-
of-state is most likely due to the geography of the state as well as the extra lead time.  
  
Figure 4.6 Percentages of people who evacuated to out-of-state destinations by state 
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 Figure 4.7 Spatial distribution of evacuee residences/points of origin (top) 
and destinations (bottom) 
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travel to certain locations in the state; however, again, the out-of-state destinations would 
be associated with the longer travel times. Another reason for having longer travel times is 
also due to the geography of the state and the road networks. These circumstances (e.g. 
contraflow, longer lead time, being able to choose where to go, clear communication) 
possibly contribute to SC evacuees’ above average – excellent rating regarding how South 
Carolina handled the hurricane evacuation (Figure 4.9). 
 Georgia had the lowest percentage of those who traveled to out-of-state destinations 
(16.8%), but only just behind Florida (19.6%). Georgia evacuees traveled an approximate 
average of 3.8 hours, or a median of 3.5 hours. The highest percentage of evacuees who 
traveled less than one hour to their destination live in Florida, likely due to the geography, 
and thus, transportation routes, of the state. On average, Florida evacuees traveled an 
approximate average of 2.7 hours or a median of 2.5 hours.  
 
 
Figure 4.8 Travel time for evacuees by state 
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Figure 4.9 Ratings of the states’ handling of the evacuation by state 
 
 
4.1.4 Departure Times 
 Respondents who evacuated were asked the day and time of departure and were 
provided with a total of 35 possible time intervals to choose from (Figure 4.10) and/or 
choice of open response. For this analysis, only the responses that fell within the provided 
choices were used, as some of the open response choices were early and for exogenous 
reasons, such as vacations having been planned regardless of the hurricane’s impact, which 
is not considered here as evacuation for the sake of evacuation. The 35 possible choices 
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 Although the respondent-cited influences in evacuation were primarily the track 
and strength of the hurricane, the more significant peaks in the kernel density plot for each 
state in Figure 4.10 are associated with the evacuation orders given by those states for the 
original 35 time steps. For South Carolina, the initial peak of evacuee departures between 
time steps 8 and 12 essentially fall between midnight and 6 PM on Wednesday, October 
5th, which was the day Governor Nikki Haley mandated most evacuations to begin. 
Voluntary and mandatory evacuation orders were given for coastal Florida residents on 
October 5th and 6th, and the departures for these days are also visible in the plot, primarily 
between time steps 16 and 20, which correspond to a departure date of Thursday, October 
Figure 4.10 Histogram of departure time steps beginning with Tuesday, 
October 4th, between midnight and 6 AM (TS 1) to Saturday, October 8th, 
between 9 PM and midnight (TS 35) with overlaid kernel density plot by 
state. 
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6th, between 6 AM and 9 PM. A more gradual, initial peak can be seen between steps 8 and 
14, corresponding to all of Wednesday, October 5th. The mandatory evacuation order for 
Georgia was given for Thursday, October 6th, showing a significant evacuation response, 
followed by additional departures on time step 24, corresponding to Friday, October 7th, 
between 9 AM and noon. While it is evident a number of variables are taken into 
consideration in a household’s decision to evacuate, the sample data here may highlight 
that an authoritative evacuation order is the primary triggering variable (Figure 4.11); it 
may emphasize the necessity of timely action in order for successful evacuation procedures 
to take place (positive feelings from those who did experience the evacuation) and, in the 
event of a subsequent hurricane and evacuation, promote compliance.  
 
4.2 Evacuation Response: Space-Time Cube and Emerging Hot Spot Analysis 
 For Florida, the space-time cube contains point counts for 435 locations over 15 
time steps. Thirty-four of these (about 8%) contain at least one point for at least one time 
interval; the 34 point locations make up 510 space-time bins, of which 95 (~19%) have 
Figure 4.11  (Left) Boxplot of departure time distributions by state 
        (Right) Least squares means diffogram – at α=0.05, no significant     
        difference between average departure times of Florida and South Carolina 
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point counts greater than zero. With a trend statistic of 1.25 and p=0.21, there is no 
significant trend in the departure times of Florida. It is likely there is no significant 
increasing or decreasing trend due to the nature of the Mann-Kendall trend test and the 
undulating nature of the evacuation departures (day vs night), which may have simply 
“averaged” out to no trend at all, especially in Florida where the evacuations were neither 
ordered “too early” nor “too late”. 
 For Georgia, the space-time cube contains point counts for 44 locations over 14 
time steps. Fifteen of these locations (~34%) contain at least one point for at least one time 
interval; the 15 locations make up 210 space-time bins, of which 56 (~27%) have point 
counts greater than zero. With a trend statistic of 1.73 and a p = 0.08, there is strong 
evidence of an increasing departure trend in Georgia, even with the diurnal departure time 
pattern. This is likely due to the state’s evacuation warnings being given later in the entirety 
of the time period (Thursday, October 6th), effectively decreasing the available time for 
evacuation procedures to be maintained as the storm approached. 
 For South Carolina, the space-time cube contains point counts for 208 locations 
over 19 time intervals. 35 of these locations (~17%) contain at least one point for at least 
one time interval; the 35 point locations make up 665 space-time bins, of which 120 (18%) 
have point counts greater than zero. With a trend statistic of -1.5 and p = 0.13, there is 
marginal evidence of a decreasing departure trend in South Carolina over the time period 
of analysis (114 hours). The statistic agrees with the loess curve in Figure 4.10, which 
demonstrates a slightly decreasing trend over the time period, likely due to the evacuation 
orders being given well in advance of the storm’s arrival. In other words, with a longer lead 
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time, respondents who could or who wanted to leave earlier were able to leave, with fewer 
people evacuating in the later time bins (i.e. closer to the arrival of the storm). 
 Each of the three states’ space-time cubes were used as input for the Emerging Hot 
Spot Analysis; however, the tool revealed there were no hot or cold trends. Yet, when using 
a single space-time cube for all three states using default values (time step interval = 8 
hours; space-time bin distance interval = 8120 m by 8120 m), the Emerging Hot Spot 
Analysis revealed 53 (out of a total 156) oscillating cold spot trends in the southern coastal 
region of South Carolina and northern coastal region of Georgia (Figure 4.12).  
 As a reminder, an oscillating cold spot is “a statistically significant cold spot for 
the final time-step interval that has a history of also being a statistically significant hot spot 
during a prior time step, [and] less than ninety percent of the time-step intervals have been 
statistically significant cold spots (Esri, Inc. 2016).” These areas were statistically 
significant evacuation hot spots at one point due to the evacuation orders being given all at 
once and inciting significant clusters of evacuees, but “cooled” into significant cold spots 
by the final time-step interval as the possible evacuation window of opportunity closed on 
storm approach. Very few people would evacuate from the hurricane in the final time step, 
because by that point, the hurricane would already be there and it would be too late. In 
other words, none of the eight possible kinds of hot spots can apply to the departure times, 
because the final time step is not hot, and less than ninety percent of the time steps were 
significant hot spots. There were no other trends identified. It is likely that Florida trends 
were unidentifiable due to a combination of the sparse data over the fairly short period of 
time (4-5 days), and the daytime/nighttime oscillation of few data points over a relatively 
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large study area, there was not enough data overall to reveal any other significant spatial 
and temporal trends using this particular tool. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 4.12  Oscillating Cold Spot Trends in South Carolina and Georgia when using 
a single space-time cube. 
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4.3 Evacuation and Departure Time Analysis: Five Binary Logit Models 
 The differences in evacuation preferences and differences in departure times 
necessitates the investigation of whether there are household-level variables that could 
explain the variations in behavior. Five logistic regression models were specified and 
estimated to address this part of the research questions. The first regression simply models 
the relationship of evacuation (or non-evacuation) to the regressors listed previously in 
Table 3.4, for the entire study period of four days. The other four model the relationship of 
evacuation to the regressors listed in Table 3.5 for each of Day 1, Day 2, Day 3, and Day 
4. In this way, we can begin to understand which variables significantly affected evacuation 
timing during Hurricane Matthew, for this sample.  
 The purpose of the research presented is not to fully model evacuation behaviors, 
nor predict them, because it is impossible due to the uniqueness of each hurricane 
evacuation. However, measures of predictive power (i.e. R2 and Area Under Curve (AUC) 
values) and goodness-of-fit (i.e. Hosmer-Lemeshow) are provided below to give an idea of 
how much these models could improve by including other variables or interaction terms 
(Table 4.1). The measures of predictive power for all five regressions are, in the context of 
social science research, decent, although the range of values of the max-rescaled R2 
(Nagelkerke-adjusted R2) of 0.0868 to 0.2721 might seem pretty low. There has been 
discussion in statistics literature concerning the most appropriate methods of assessing 
model fit for logistic regressions, namely, arguments on how R2 measures may or may not 
be the most suitable. For instance, Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000, p. 167) opine: 
“…Low R2 values in logistic regression are the norm and this presents a 
problem when reporting their values to an audience accustomed to seeing 
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linear regression values… Thus we do not recommend routine publishing 
of R2 values from fitted logistic regression models. However, they may be 
helpful in the model building state as a statistic to evaluate competing 
models.” 
While there may be issues with interpretation from a broader audience, R2 values are given 
here because R2 is a very commonly provided measure-of-fit in statistical modeling. 
Additionally, AUC values are provided, where 0.5 indicates a “failed” test (i.e. the model 
randomly separates the group into evacuation and non-evacuation), and 1 indicates a very 
good test (i.e. the test can correctly discriminate and classify those who evacuate or not). 
The p-values from the Hosmer-Lemeshow (H-L) goodness-of-fit test are shown in the last 
column, with p-values above 0.05 indicating an acceptable model fit. 
Table 4.1 Predictive power and goodness-of-fit  
Model Total 
Pop. 
Sample* 95% 
Conf. 
Interval 
Pseudo R2 
(Nagelkerke) 
AUC-ROC H-L 
AllDays  3,814,112  561  ± 4.14  0.2721 0.7600 (fair) 0.0563 
Day1  3,814,112  383  ± 5.01  0.0868 0.7071 (fair) 0.6792 
Day2  3,814,112  383  ± 5.01  0.1258 0.6568 (poor) 0.9999 
Day3  3,814,112  383  ± 5.01  0.1410 0.6747 (poor) 0.9999 
Day4  3,814,112  383  ± 5.01  0.1137 0.7044 (fair) 0.9841 
*The sample for model AllDays includes both evacuees and non-evacuees. The samples 
for models Day1-Day4 are only for evacuees who provided us with a departure time. 
 
4.3.1 Model Results for Overall Evacuation Response 
 The results of the first model provide some insight to why a household evacuated 
or did not evacuate (any contributions to evacuation responses from variables such as 
number of pets or risk area awareness), during the entire study period. Under the logistic 
model, there is strong evidence that the chance of a household evacuation changes with 
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PREEXP (p=0.001), EVACORDER (p<0.0001), TELLSCORE (p=0.006), EVACZONE 
(p=0.070), NPETS (0.055), and HHINC2015 (p=0.062), controlling for all other variables.  
 Table 4.2 shows the Type 3 Analysis of Effects output table based on the Wald Chi-
Square test from PROC LOGISTIC. It indicates there is no evidence that evacuation is 
related to STATE, WHOSCORE, HOWSCORE, FEMAZONE, NLIVHH, and 
NAUTOHH. Essentially, over the duration of the evacuation for all three states, an 
evacuation response from this sample depends on prior experience with hurricanes, receipt 
of an evacuation order, how many subjects the respondent told about the evacuation, 
whether they knew they live in a hurricane evacuation zone, the number of pets in the 
household, and household income in 2015.  
Table 4.2 Type 3 Analysis of Effects and significance. 
Variables and p-values in bold are of strong to marginal 
significance (p<0.15). 
Type 3 Analysis of Effects 
Effect DF Wald Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
state 1 0.0277 0.8678 
preexp 1 10.3059 0.0013 
evacorder 1 37.9446 <.0001 
whoscore 1 0.1324 0.7159 
howscore 1 0.0785 0.7796 
tellscore 1 7.4852 0.0062 
evaczone 2 5.3165 0.0701 
femazone 2 2.5469 0.2799 
nlivhh 1 0.0807 0.7764 
nautohh 1 0.3773 0.5391 
npets 1 3.6815 0.0550 
hhinc2015 1 3.4965 0.0615 
 
The odds ratio estimates and 90% confidence intervals for the variables are provided in 
Table 4.3. The results show:  
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1. There is very strong evidence that the odds of evacuating for those without prior 
hurricane experience are about twice the odds (=2.23) of evacuating for those with 
prior experience. 
2. There is very strong evidence that the odds of evacuating from Matthew for those 
who received an evacuation order are about 4.8 times higher (=1/0.210) than those 
who did not receive an evacuation order. 
3. There is also very strong evidence that for those who told more subjects about the 
order to evacuate, the odds of evacuating were greater – for a one unit increase in 
the number of subjects the respondent told about the evacuation order, the odds of 
evacuating increased by a factor of about 1.2. 
4. There is strong evidence that the odds of evacuating from Matthew for those  
a. Who think they know they live in an evacuation zone is about twice (=1/0.43) 
those who think they know they do not live in an evacuation zone. 
b. Who said they did not know whether they live in an evacuation zone are about 
3 times higher (=1/0.34) than for those who think they know they do not live in 
an evacuation zone.  
5. There is strong evidence that for the households with more pets, the odds of 
evacuating decreases – the odds of evacuating is about 10% higher per every one  
unit decrease in the number of pets. 
6. There is strong evidence that for households with higher incomes, the odds of 
evacuating increases – the odds of evacuating is 17% higher per every unit increase 
in the income category. 
Table 4.3 Odds ratio estimates for evacuation and Wald confidence 
intervals for the OR estimates 
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4.3.2 Model Results for Day 1 
 Similarly to the regression results in the previous section, the results of the logistic 
regression models for each day allow us to begin to assess the potential reasons for an 
evacuation, but in these cases are framed by temporal contexts (i.e. why a household 
evacuated when they did). The regression model for the first day (MODELD1 – Tuesday, 
October 4) reveals that, under the logistic model, there is strong evidence that the chance a 
household evacuates changes with STATE (which state they were from, i.e. the time of 
evacuation order dissemination), and NAUTOHH, controlling for other variables. No other 
variables met the 0.15 significance level to be entered into the model (Table 4.4).  
 
Odds Ratio Estimates and Wald Confidence Intervals 
Odds Ratio Estimate 90% Confidence Limits 
state 0.978 0.784 1.219 
preexp no vs yes 2.226 1.477 3.354 
evacorder no vs yes 0.21 0.139 0.319 
whoscore 0.973 0.861 1.1 
howscore 0.981 0.874 1.1 
tellscore 1.225 1.084 1.384 
evaczone no vs yes 0.43 0.208 0.889 
evaczone no vs don't know 0.34 0.158 0.734 
evaczone yes vs don't know 0.792 0.514 1.219 
femazone no vs yes 0.711 0.476 1.062 
femazone no vs don't know 0.717 0.465 1.106 
femazone yes vs don't know 1.009 0.638 1.596 
nlivhh 0.973 0.83 1.14 
nautohh 0.923 0.744 1.144 
npets 0.899 0.82 0.985 
hhinc2015 1.173 1.019 1.349 
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Table 4.4 Variables meeting the criteria to enter the model via forward selection 
Summary of Forward Selection – MODELD1 
Step Effect Entered DF Number In Score Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
1 state 2 1 7.0659 0.0292 
2 nautohh 1 2 3.4849 0.0619 
 
The analysis of maximum likelihood estimates (Table 4.5) shows that, on the first day of 
evacuation: 
1. There is marginal evidence that for respondents living in South Carolina, the odds 
of evacuating were over 3 times as large as the odds for those living in Georgia. In 
essence, because the first evacuation orders were announced on Day 1 in South 
Carolina (to begin officially on Day 2), people started to leave sooner in South 
Carolina, which shows the importance of providing a mandatory evacuation order 
with sufficient lead time. It is also important to note that there is no significant 
difference between Florida and Georgia residents because, while some Florida 
residents began to leave on the first day, orders for Florida were announced and 
disseminated on the second day. 
2. There is strong evidence that for every unit increase in NAUTOHH, the odds of 
evacuating decreased by about 50% on the first day. This is not to say that 
households with more cars were less likely to leave on the first day, simply because 
they had more cars. While it could imply that it could simply be due to the 
household deciding how many cars to take in the evacuation, there could be other 
reasons for this statistical result (i.e. mediating variables), such as possibly having 
a bigger household. 
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Table 4.5 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates with coefficients and 
exponentiated coefficients (i.e. Odds ratios - “Exp(Est)”) 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates – MODELD1 
Parameter  DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq Exp(Est) 
Intercept   1 -2.5018 0.9648 6.7243 0.0095 0.082 
state SC 1 1.2370 0.7733 2.5586 0.1097 3.445 
state FL 1 0.0520 0.9312 0.0031 0.9555 1.053 
nautohh   1 -0.6446 0.3411 3.5707 0.0588 0.525 
 
4.3.3 Model Results for Days 2 and 3 
 The regression models for both the second and third days (MODELD2 – 
Wednesday, October 5; MODELD3 – Thursday, October 6) reveal that there is very strong 
evidence that the chance a household evacuates changes only with STATE, holding all 
other variables fixed, and no other variables entered either of the models (Table 4.6).  
Table 4.6 Variables meeting the criteria to enter both MODELD2 and 
MODELD3 via forward selection 
Summary of Forward Selection –  
MODELD2 (Top row) 
MODELD3 (Bottom row) 
Step Effect Entered DF Number In Score Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
1 state 2 1 31.5844 <.0001 
1 state 2 1 41.8648 <.0001 
 
The analysis of maximum likelihood estimates (Table 4.7) shows: 
1. There is very strong evidence that on Day 2 of evacuation, the odds of evacuation 
for SC respondents is about 7 times that of GA respondents; the odds of evacuation 
for FL respondents is about 4.7 times that of GA respondents.  
2. On Day 3 of evacuation, there is very strong evidence that the odds of evacuation 
for GA respondents is almost 5 times larger (=1/0.206) than the odds of evacuation 
for SC respondents, while there is no strong evidence that the odds of evacuation 
for GA respondents is any different from FL respondents. 
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This essentially reveals there is very strong evidence that the chance a household evacuates 
changes with evacuation order time or the day evacuations are announced, controlling for 
all other variables. The analysis of maximum likelihood estimates shows that for 
respondents who received an earlier evacuation order or anticipated receiving an 
evacuation order, the odds of evacuating were greater than the odds of evacuating for those 
who lived in states with later evacuation order times. In Figure 4.11 above, the least-squares 
means diffogram showed no statistically significant difference between the departure times 
of FL and SC residents, and differences between FL and GA, and SC and GA residents; 
the odds ratios here show how big the relative differences are. 
Table 4.7 (Top) Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates with coefficients and 
exponentiated coefficients (i.e. Odds ratios - “Exp(Est)”). 
(Bottom) Odds ratio estimates with 90% confidence intervals. 
 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates –  
MODELD2 (Top 3 rows) 
MODELD3 (Bottom 3 rows) 
Parameter  DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq Exp(Est) 
Intercept 
 
1 -2.2454 0.3505 41.0328 <.0001 0.106 
state SC 1 1.9610 0.3820 26.3520 <.0001 7.107 
state FL 1 1.5389 0.4040 14.5071 0.0001 4.659 
Intercept 
 
1 0.8071 0.2233 13.0626 0.0003 2.241 
state SC 1 -1.5775 0.2757 32.7495 <.0001 0.206 
state FL 1 -0.4091 0.2950 1.9230 0.1655 0.664 
 
Odds Ratio Estimates and Profile-Likelihood 
Confidence Intervals  –  
MODELD2 (Top row) 
MODELD3 (Bottom row)  
Effect Unit Estimate 
90% Confidence 
Limits 
state SC vs GA 1.0000 7.107 3.919        13.901 
state FL vs GA 1.0000 4.659 2.465          9.401 
state SC vs GA 1.0000 0.206 0.130          0.323 
state FL vs GA 1.0000 0.664 0.407          1.076 
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4.3.4 Model Results for Day 4 
 On Day 4 of the evacuation – Friday, October 7 – Hurricane Matthew was just off 
the east coast of Florida as a Category 4 hurricane (next downgraded to a 3 on the same 
day). The regression model for the fourth day (MODELD4) reveals there is strong evidence 
that the chance a household evacuates changes with STATE, PREEXP, and 
EVACORDER. No other variables met the significance criteria for entry into the model 
(Table 4.8).   
Table 4.8 Variables meeting the criteria to enter the model via forward 
selection 
Summary of Forward Selection – MODELD4 
Step Effect Entered DF Number In Score Chi-Square Pr > ChiSq 
1 state 2 1 11.6024 0.0030 
2 preexp 1 2 7.4620 0.0063 
3 evacorder 1 3 3.2220 0.0727 
 
The analysis of maximum likelihood estimates (Table 4.9) shows: 
1. There is very strong evidence that the odds of evacuation for Georgia respondents 
were about 6 times larger (=1/0.161) than for those living in Florida. Evacuations 
were ordered for coastal Georgia on Thursday (Day 3), and most of the Florida 
residents who could evacuate or who wanted to evacuate, probably would have 
done so by this point, resulting in this difference. 
2. There is strong evidence that the odds of evacuating for those with prior hurricane 
experience were almost 2.5 larger (=1/0.404) than the odds of evacuating for those 
without prior hurricane experience. 
3. There is strong evidence that the odds of evacuating for those who did not receive 
an order to evacuate were about twice as large as for those who had received an 
order. For Day 4 of evacuation procedures, this could mean a heightened perception 
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of risk for those who did not have to evacuate or were not mandated to evacuate, 
based on their personal assessment of the storm track and strength. This could also 
explain the second result concerning the evacuation of those with prior hurricane 
experience. The importance of storm-specific physical factors in an individual’s 
decision to evacuate or remain has been confirmed in previous research. This result 
could also simply be a “statistical result,” whereby most of those who did receive 
an order had already evacuated, so the only people who could still evacuate at this 
point in time would be those who did not receive an evacuation order.  
 
Table 4.9 Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates with coefficients and 
exponentiated coefficients (i.e. Odds ratios - “Exp(Est)”) 
Analysis of Maximum Likelihood Estimates – MODELD4 
Parameter  DF Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
Wald Chi-
Square 
Pr > ChiSq Exp(Est) 
Intercept 
 
1 -1.7525 0.1905 84.6732 <.0001 0.173 
state SC 1 -0.3311 0.3450 0.9214 0.3371 0.718 
state FL 1 -1.8267 0.5358 11.6212 0.0007 0.161 
preexp no 1 -0.9074 0.3673 6.1037 0.0135 0.404 
evacorder no 1 0.7189 0.4060 3.1357 0.0766 2.052 
 
4.4 Summary of Results 
 To answer the research questions regarding the existence and magnitude of any spatial 
and temporal differences in evacuation behaviors, and subsequently, the household-level 
variables contributing to such variations (especially in departure times), descriptive results 
and results from space-time pattern analysis and logistic regression models were provided.  
 Overall, 62.2% of the Florida sample, 76.7% of the Georgia sample, and 67.1% of the 
South Carolina sample evacuated, while 69.6% of Florida respondents, 90.6% of Georgia 
respondents, and 71.8% of South Carolina respondents said they actually received an 
evacuation order. Respondents from all three states cited the hurricane track as the primary 
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motivator to evacuate, while the hurricane’s strength was an additional motivator for 
Florida respondents, and a secondary motivator for Georgia and South Carolina 
respondents. In Florida, the primary factor contributing to non-evacuation was the path of 
the hurricane, followed by concern for property, and the strength of the hurricane. Georgia 
respondents cited both the strength and the track of the hurricane as primary factors for 
non-evacuation, followed by traffic concerns. In South Carolina, the main influence for 
remaining was the strength of the hurricane, followed by the path of the hurricane, and 
concern for property.  
 The results of the space-time pattern analysis revealed no trends when assessing each 
of the three states; however, when assessing all three states together using the tool’s default 
inputs, a statistically significant cold spot (with hot spot history) was detected for the final 
time interval in the southern coastal region of South Carolina and northern coastal region 
of Georgia. This is likely a result of the evacuation orders being disseminated all at once 
(especially for the Georgia coast), then evacuation no longer being an option as Matthew 
neared the coast. However, in general, there was probably not enough appropriate data to 
reveal any other significant spatial and temporal trends using this tool. 
 With regards to the variables contributing to an evacuation response, over the four-
day duration of the evacuation for the entire sample, an observed evacuation depended on 
not having prior hurricane experience, having received an evacuation order, an increased 
level of communication about the evacuation order, believing one lived in an evacuation 
zone, not knowing if one lived in an evacuation zone (i.e. knowledge of the risk area), 
having fewer pets in the household, and higher household income in 2015. However, only 
12 variables were used as inputs to the logistic regression, so it is likely that there could be 
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other variables explaining why someone evacuated or did not evacuate. While STATE did 
not contribute to the overall evacuation response (i.e. was not significant in the first logistic 
regression for the overall time period), STATE was the only variable which was significant 
for each of the four days’ logistic regressions. Essentially, for each day, there were 
consistent differences in evacuation between the states. 
 The descriptive results provided makes clear that a number of variables are taken into 
consideration in a household’s decision to evacuate, but the results from the subsequent 
analyses, namely the logistic regression models, may highlight that an authoritative 
evacuation order is the primary triggering variable. The results emphasize the necessity of 
timely action in order for successful evacuation procedures to take place (for example, 
positive feelings from those who did experience the evacuation) and, in the event of a 
subsequent hurricane and evacuation, promote compliance.  
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CHAPTER FIVE: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
 This research set out to assess spatial and temporal differences in evacuation 
behaviors during Hurricane Matthew, taking into account certain household-level variables 
that could explain such differences, influencing decision-making and evacuation behavior, 
especially time of departure. Specifically, it set out to answer whether there were any 
spatial and temporal differences in Hurricane Matthew evacuation behaviors along the 
coasts of Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina; If so, what were the differences, and are 
there individual or household-level variables that could lead to such differences, especially 
in the amount of time between warning issuance and the initiation of protective action? 
Through a survey of coastal residents, descriptive statistical results, space-time analysis, 
and logistic regression models, results show that there are many finer differences in 
evacuation behaviors, but the timing between South Carolina and Georgia, and Florida and 
Georgia presented a significant difference. Not only do the statistical results show this, but 
comments from the survey respondents reflect this difference as well. So, while Hurricane 
Matthew presented a threat to the eastern coastline of the three states for the duration of 
the forecast from the first mention of a part of the contiguous US (i.e. the coastline was 
contained in the cone of uncertainty from NHC advisory 22 through 43), and while 
mandatory evacuation orders appear to be of a tertiary influence in evacuation according 
to the respondents, the timing of departures in this sample are different between the three 
states because the evacuation orders triggered the behavioral response. Whether the orders
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resulted directly in a household’s evacuation response, or resulted in a household 
researching the storm specific variables which then convinced them to leave, or resulted in 
a household discussing possible options with friends or neighbors, the influence of the 
authoritative recommendation should not be overlooked; this emphasizes the significance 
of a timely evacuation order. 
 For the full binary logistic regression model, it is interesting how only one of the 
milling factor scores, TELLSCORE, showed strong evidence of changing the probability 
of evacuation. Receiving information is, in a way, passive, so from whom and what modes 
people received evacuation information may not influence a “successful” outcome. 
Actively telling others about the evacuation order may be a sign of an individual’s or 
household’s participation or interest in the event. 
 Prior research shows there is evidence that pet ownership decreases the chance of 
evacuation for that household (Whitehead 2003; Bowser and Cutter 2015). The results of 
the full logistic regression model shows there is evidence for a negative effect of NPETS 
on evacuation (p=0.055), which provides further confirmatory evidence of how pet 
ownership places constraints on evacuation behavior. In contrast, in prior research, 
household income plays an inconsistent or nonsignificant role in evacuation behavior 
(Huang, Lindell, and Prater 2016a); in this study, there is marginal evidence that the 
probability of evacuation increases with every increase in categories of HHINC2015. 
However, one must take into account that income is often confounded with other variables 
such as risk area (Baker 1991) and take caution with the interpretation provided. It may 
seem that in this sample, having a higher income implies having more resources to be able 
to leave (e.g. being able to afford a hotel or motel, being able to take time off of work), but 
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it could also be that households in more expensive waterfront properties felt the need to 
evacuate due to their physical susceptibility. 
 Concerning a household’s spatial awareness, not knowing whether one lives in an 
evacuation zone compared to those who do know, increased the chance of evacuating. If a 
respondent did not actually live in an evacuation zone but felt it was necessary to evacuate, 
it could contribute to a phenomenon called “shadow evacuation” where those who are not 
ordered to do so end up evacuating anyway. For instance, on Day 4 of the evacuation, the 
logistic regression model showed higher odds of evacuating for people who did not receive 
an evacuation order. Sometimes, large shadow evacuations can result in increased traffic 
congestion and provide significant barriers to evacuating for those who may need to do so. 
Such barriers may lead a household to not evacuate in the next hurricane, which emphasizes 
the need of communicating to and educating the public on where one resides in relation to 
risk areas. The results (refer to section 4.1) concerning the percentage of evacuees from 
non-evacuation zones could potentially reflect a large evacuation shadow response for 
Florida and South Carolina, potentially due to spatial and temporal contexts of Matthew. 
For instance, hurricane Hermine struck Florida about a month before Matthew as a weaker 
storm and managed to disturb electric power for certain municipalities for a length of time, 
and in 2015, damaging and life-threatening flooding occurred across South Carolina. 
However, interpreting these results as the occurrence of a large evacuation shadow may 
not be an entirely appropriate assumption to make. A respondent may live in a mobile home 
or low-lying area, and while not in an evacuation zone, per se, they may have evacuated 
due to their susceptibility, and often specific orders for these physically vulnerable 
populations.  
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 The result in the overall logit model that reveals an evacuation during the days prior 
to Matthew’s landfall depends on reception of an evacuation order confirms past research 
on the significance of recommendations for protective actions from public officials. 
Moreover, in the logistic regression models for each day, the state variable was the only 
variable entered for each of the four days. It is a difficult variable to interpret – the 
observation of an evacuation and its timing depends on the state – but understanding that 
the relative differences between the states (e.g. odds ratios, least squares means diffogram, 
space-time cube trend statistics) generally matches the times the official recommendations 
were disseminated provides some clarity.  
 However, statistical results do not convey the experience of individuals in an 
evacuation, which are important to consider. Survey respondents were allowed to write 
comments at the end of the online survey. While a few comments from Georgia residents 
were mainly positive, a number of comments mentioned difficulties finding information 
on evacuation, resorting to using information from South Carolina and Florida, and the 
evacuation order(s) being issued too late to evacuate (see select quotes from GA 
respondents below). These comments agree with the previous research and the results from 
the logistic regressions, and also help explain the relatively higher proportion of Georgia 
respondents rating Georgia’s handling of the evacuation as somewhere between “very 
poor” and “average” (refer to Figure 4.9). While it is difficult to order an evacuation when 
it is entirely possible the track could shift and residents could subsequently be frustrated at 
having to endure an “unnecessary” evacuation, it seems that providing clear and timely 
information to those who need it would ensure the evacuation occurs safely and 
swimmingly. 
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 Quotes taken verbatim from survey: 
· Georgia waited too long to issue the evacuation. 
· It was VERY difficult to find information on evacuation. I'm not a Facebook 
user and I had to look there to get community info from police. We were totally 
in the dark about it all until an unexpected text message arrived to say 
evacuation was lifted. 
· It appeared that the state was the only one considering all surrounding states 
that did not know what to do and when. It also appeared that Camden County 
was the worst of the counties during this period. 
· I thought the governor should have been on TV earlier giving GA residents 
information. Most of our information was from the FL governor.  We live 
close to JAX so we just followed his instructions. 
· The EMA did a poor job at keeping the public informed. The EMA of Camden 
County didn't issue an evacuation order until late Thursday afternoon. 
· It appeared to me and some neighbors that Gov Deal was forced to "up his 
game" due to the excellent response of Gov Haley in SC. He appeared 
uninterested until the storm was closing-in on the Ga coast. 
· Most of the information available was from South Carolina.  We had little 
information available from Georgia.  We ended up calling local police 
department to know when and what would be involved in returning. This was 
not just my opinion, it was the opinion of many.  We called each other by 
phone, Atlanta, Augusta, and other towns to compare information.  Most had 
little.  This was one of the worst evacuations that I have experienced, and 
because of lack of information, and timely, evacuation notice. 
· Not everyone has Facebook so other information output methods would be 
helpful 
· Make the mandatory evacuation sooner and make employees not demand that 
employees return to work the day after the hurricane. 
· SC was so good, and the Georgia state government was way behind the 8-
ball. 
· The state office waited to long to call the evac. Greater advanced notice can 
save lives and property. Re entry was handled poorly, local authorities did 
not communicate with each other. 
· I felt the state should have gotten involved a little quicker than what they did, 
knowing that the hurricane was heading in our direction. 
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· We should follow SC lead next time.  They handled it more effectively than 
Ga. 
· We depended on a local radio group that had non stop coverage during the 
storm and aftermath. Cema and local government should have a person 
assigned to assist with information to the radio stations. I know TV stations 
had coverage, but we have Comcast so we lost signal at beginning of storm.  
The evacuation notices were not clear and seemed to come very late. 
 
 With regards to the influence of past hurricane experience on evacuation response, 
previous research results have been inconsistent. In this study, there was strong evidence 
that having no past hurricane experience significantly increased the chance of an 
evacuation. Reasons for this could be that more experienced individuals or households feel 
more prepared to weather a hurricane, or that past hurricanes were not as severe or 
dangerous to necessitate an evacuation. Another reason could be that past hurricane 
experiences were regarded as inconvenient false alarms compounded by concerns of traffic 
and not being able to return home promptly. A number of the responses (see below for 
select comments from FL, GA, SC) not only complained about the delay in returning home, 
but also were incredibly frustrated with the lack of communication about the delay in 
returning home. There seemed to be different pieces of information for the evacuees being 
able to return, as in some locations, officials lifted the evacuation/gave the all-clear, while 
at the same time law enforcement authorities did not allow residents to re-enter the area(s). 
 Quotes taken verbatim from survey: 
Georgia 
· After hurricane Floyd did not to get in the massive traffic jam. 
· The city of Brunswick had a unique experience with re-entry. The city 
announced that everyone was allowed to return with no 
limitations/exceptions, but the state troopers blocked the on/off ramps and 
refused re-entry to anyone, including residents. For an entire day, they re-
directed people attempting to re-enter Brunswick around and around a loop. 
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The troopers were not helpful in providing information, and even prohibited 
our local news reporters (who stayed to keep locals informed about the 
situation) from entering the city. This experience will definitely negatively 
factor into any future decision to evacuate. 
· Would probably leave for a stronger hurricane or more direct hit. Neighbors 
had trouble returning home, which discourages some from evacuating. 
· One major concern of evacuating was the difficulty of returning home. We 
stayed and would have had to wait several days to return home to check on 
our house. 
Florida 
· Governor overplayed evacuation requirements 
· I would evacuate as a last choice.  Being on a peninsula, you stand a good 
chance of being stuck on the road.  Also, the hurricanes change direction and 
unless it's a cat 5, I'd stay put. 
· Our gated community is .4 mile from the Atlantic.  A limb hit our deck railing 
causing light damage otherwise we were totally untouched.  Next time I'll 
stay. 
· I will be better parpared the next time. and leave early or stay on the island 
like most of my family this was not a good experience just like Floyd, or move 
out of this state. 
South Carolina 
· They needed to let the residents back in sooner than they did.  This will effect 
my decision to stay or go for the next Hurricane. 
· We'd consider evacuation for future anticipated hurricane strikes to the 
Lowcountry, as we'll never forget experiencing Hurricane Hugo at a friend's 
new home in Goose Creek.  However, the state government's never-failing 
interminable delay in allowing property owners to return home and secure 
their structure(s) and belongings prohibits us in good conscience from 
seriously considering actually making an evacuation unless there's a 90+% 
probability of absolute total destruction in the southern Dorchester County 
area. 
· The Governor was totally hysterical and raised too much public alarm for a 
minor hurricane. I will not evacuate next time unless I am convinced by my 
own evaluation that the hurricane is truly dangerous. I wasted over $900  in 
travel and hotel expenses for a totally unnecessary evacuation. The 
evacuation order should have been restricted strictly to coastal areas/islands. 
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Too many people were evacuated causing chaos and too many people on the 
roads. 
· Due to return process delay of 3 days, not sure we will evacuate next time. 
 
Again, here, while the statistical result adds to previous research, the comments 
above illustrate how having hurricane experience (and evacuation experience) can change 
the probabilities of evacuation for a future hurricane. These comments reinforce the 
importance of consistent and accessible communication after the hurricane, explicitly 
stating the reasons behind “unnecessary” evacuations and being “banned” from returning 
until it is safe to do so (e.g. more efficient debris clearing). All of the results (quantitative 
and qualitative) emphasize the necessity of both well-timed official recommendations for 
people to take protective actions and effective communication, during the pre- and post-
storm phases, which could help encourage reluctant coastal individuals/households to 
evacuate in a future hurricane. 
The analyses presented in this thesis aim to provide some insight into the evacuation 
behaviors in Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina during Hurricane Matthew in October 
2016 by employing GIS tools, statistical tests and logistic modeling. The research primarily 
focuses on reviewing some of the differences in behavioral responses and assessing the 
contribution of a subset of survey variables on observations of evacuation for the four-day 
time period, and breaks down the analyses by day to assess which variables significantly 
contribute to an early, timely, or later evacuation.  
While it is impossible to model human behaviors to full capacity, the aim of this 
work was to contribute to the wealth of hurricane evacuation literature and potentially 
reveal some new information by incorporating behavioral factors in the analysis of 
evacuation timing. The next steps for research using this data should investigate this 
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sample’s level of representativeness of the population, analyze the entire variable list to 
determine which other variables contributed to evacuation during Hurricane Matthew, or 
possibly break down the logistic regression for the overall time period by state. With 
regards to hurricane evacuation research in general, the limitations discovered in this 
research presents opportunities – decreasing survey response rates over time, missing 
responses in the dataset, or time and monetary costs of conducting survey research, should 
push us to consider other complementary sources of data. However, it must be made clear 
that other novel methods of assessing evacuation responses probably will not address the 
question of why an individual or household did or did not evacuate. Yet, with more data 
and complete data, possibly aggregated from multiple sources (e.g. obtaining from a survey 
a higher response rate with fewer skipped questions, combined with tracking and 
transportation data), better results could come from similar analyses, with a more complete 
picture of variables that contribute to household departure timing. 
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APPENDIX A: NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER ADVISORIES 26 THROUGH 43 
AND ASSOCIATED WATCHES AND WARNINGS 
 
 This appendix provides more context to the study area, namely, the physical threat 
presented along the Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina coasts. Shown here are the 
hurricane watches and warnings from the National Hurricane Center’s forecast advisories 
26 through 43, as they were the advisories with the first and last watch/warning of the study 
area. The information from these forecast advisories were acquired from the Hurricane  
Matthew Advisory Archive, which can be accessed at 
https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2016/MATTHEW.shtml. 
 67 
ADV 
NUM 
DATE WARNING 
 
WATCH 
 
STORM 
LOCATION 
MAX 
SUS 
WIND 
26 10/4/2016 
 
DEERFIELD 
BEACH TO THE 
VOLUSIA/BREVA
RD COUNTY 
LINE 
18.9N, 74.3W 125 KT 
27 10/4/2016 
 
GOLDEN BEACH 
TO THE 
VOLUSIA/BREVA
RD COUNTY 
LINE 
19.8N, 74.3W 120 KT 
28 10/5/2016 NORTH OF 
GOLDEN 
BEACH TO 
SEBASTIAN 
INLET LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE 
NORTH OF 
SEBASTIAN 
INLET TO THE 
FLAGLER/VOLUS
IA COUNTY LINE 
20.4N, 74.4W 115 KT 
29 10/5/2016 NORTH OF 
GOLDEN 
BEACH TO 
SEBASTIAN 
INLET LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE 
NORTH OF 
SEBASTIAN 
INLET TO THE 
FERNANDINA 
BEACH 
21.1N, 74.6W 110 KT 
30 10/5/2016 NORTH OF 
GOLDEN 
BEACH TO 
THE 
FLAGLER/VO
LUSIA 
COUNTY LINE 
LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE 
NORTH OF THE 
FLAGLER/VOLUS
IA COUNTY LINE 
TO FERNANDINA 
BEACH 
21.8N, 75.2W 105 KT 
31 10/5/2016 NORTH OF 
GOLDEN 
BEACH TO 
THE 
FLAGLER/VO
LUSIA 
COUNTY LINE 
LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE 
NORTH OF THE 
FLAGLER/VOLUS
IA COUNTY LINE 
TO SAVANNAH 
RIVER 
22.5N, 75.7W 105 KT 
32 10/6/2016 NORTH OF 
GOLDEN 
BEACH TO 
NORTH OF 
FERNANDINA 
23.4N, 76.4W 100 KT 
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FERNANDINA 
BEACH LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE 
BEACH TO 
EDISTO BEACH 
33 10/6/2016 NORTH OF 
GOLDEN 
BEACH 
FLORIDA TO 
ALTAMAHA 
SOUND 
GEORGIA 
LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE 
NORTH OF 
ALTAMAHA 
SOUND TO 
SOUTH SANTEE 
RIVER SOUTH 
CAROLINA 
24.2N, 77.1W 110 KT 
34 10/6/2016 NORTH OF 
GOLDEN 
BEACH 
FLORIDA TO 
EDISTO 
BEACH 
SOUTH 
CAROLINA 
LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE 
NORTH OF 
EDISTO BEACH 
TO SOUTH 
SANTEE RIVER 
SOUTH 
CAROLINA 
25.1N, 77.8W 120 KT 
35 10/6/2016 NORTH OF 
GOLDEN 
BEACH TO 
SOUTH 
SANTEE 
RIVER LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE 
 
26.2N, 78.6W 120 KT 
36 10/7/2016 BOCA RATON 
TO SOUTH 
SANTEE 
RIVER LAKE 
OKEECHOBEE 
 
27.1N, 79.2W 115 KT 
37 10/7/2016 JUPITER 
INLET TO 
SOUTH 
SANTEE 
RIVER 
 
28.2N, 80.0W 105 KT 
38 10/7/2016 COCOA 
BEACH TO 
SURF CITY 
NORTH OF SURF 
CITY TO CAPE 
LOOKOUT 
29.4N, 80.5W 105 KT 
39 10/7/2016 NORTH OF 
FLAGLER/VO
LUSIA 
NORTH OF SURF 
CITY TO CAPE 
LOOKOUT 
30.2N, 80.7W 95 KT 
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COUNTY LINE 
TO SURF CITY 
40 10/8/2016 NORTH OF 
FERNANDINA 
BEACH TO 
SURF CITY 
NORTH OF SURF 
CITY TO CAPE 
LOOKOUT 
31.2N, 80.5W 90 KT 
41 10/8/2016 NORTH OF 
ALTAMAHA 
SOUND TO 
SURF CITY 
NORTH OF SURF 
CITY TO CAPE 
LOOKOUT 
32.0N, 80.5W 90 KT 
42 10/8/2016 NORTH OF 
ALTAMAHA 
SOUND TO 
SURF CITY 
NORTH OF SURF 
CITY TO CAPE 
LOOKOUT 
33.0N, 79.4W 65 KT 
43 10/8/2016 NORTH OF 
SOUTH OF 
SANTEE 
RIVER TO 
SURF CITY 
NORTH OF SURF 
CITY TO CAPE 
LOOKOUT 
33.8N, 78.2W 65 KT 
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APPENDIX B: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 This appendix provides the online survey which randomly selected participants 
had the choice to take. Questions are shown in the left column, with multiple choice 
responses or open-ended responses denoted in the right-hand column. Binary choices are 
denoted with a “(Y/N)” for a yes or no response. Only a few of these variables were 
analyzed in this thesis. 
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RespondentID  
CollectorID  
StartDate  
EndDate  
IP Address  
If you agree to participate in the survey, please 
enter the letter and number code printed on the 
mailing label above your name. Open-Ended Response 
Prior to Hurricane Matthew, have you ever personally 
experienced a hurricane? 
Response (Y/N/Don’t 
know) 
Prior to Hurricane Matthew, have you ever evacuated 
from a hurricane before? (If response to previous 
question was No or Don’t know, this question was 
skipped.) Response (Y/N) 
Where did you go? Please check all that apply. Airbnb 
 
Church or place of 
worship 
 
Home of a friend or 
relative in my county 
 
Home of a friend or 
relative outside of my 
county 
 Hotel or motel 
 
Pet-friendly hotel or 
motel 
 
Pet-friendly public 
shelter 
 
Public shelter (or Red 
Cross shelter) 
 Workplace 
 
Don't know or don't 
remember 
 Other (please specify) 
Where was this located? Please enter the city and the 
state. Open-Ended Response 
Were you ordered to evacuate for Hurricane Matthew? Response (Y/N) 
At any time after the Governor issued an evacuation 
order, did you attempt to get more information about 
what you should do from any of the following 
sources? Please check all that apply. 
Didn't try to get more 
information 
 Co-worker 
 Employer 
 Family member 
 Friend 
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Local police or sheriff's 
office 
 Neighbor 
 Relative 
 
State Office for 
Emergency Services 
 State Governor's office 
 Other (please specify) 
At any time after the Governor issued an evacuation 
order, how did you get more information? Please 
check all that apply. E-mail message 
 
Face-to-face from 
another person (friend, 
family, co-worker, 
employer) 
 Internet 
 Radio 
 
Social media such as 
Twitter or Facebook 
 
Telephone call--land line 
or cell phone 
 Television 
 Text message 
 Tone alert radio 
 
Did not try to get more 
information 
 Other (please specify) 
At any time after the Governor issued an evacuation 
order, did you tell anyone else about the order to 
evacuate? Please check all that apply. 
Did not share 
information with others 
 Co-workers 
 Employer 
 Family members 
 Friends 
 Neighbors 
 Relatives 
 Other (please specify) 
Did you evacuate in response to Hurricane Matthew? 
(Depending on response, remaining questions were 
either skipped or included.) Response (Y/N) 
Which factors influenced your decision to evacuate? 
Advice from local 
officials 
 Advice from media 
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Concern for safety of 
family and friends 
 
Mandatory evacuation 
order 
 Storm path of hurricane 
 Strength of hurricane 
 Traffic concerns 
 Other (please specify) 
What day did you leave your home? Tuesday October 4 
Wednesday October 5 
Thursday October 6 
Friday October 7 
Saturday October 8 
 Other (please specify) 
Approximately what time did you leave your home? 
Between midnight and 6 
am 
Between 6 am to 9 am 
Between 9 am to noon 
Between noon to 3 pm 
Between 3 pm to 6 pm 
Between 6 pm to 9 pm 
Between 9 pm and 
midnight 
How long (hours) did it take to reach your 
destination? Response 
How many people in your household evacuated, 
including yourself? Response 
How many vehicles did your household take? Response 
What city and state were you evacuating from? Open-Ended Response 
  
What city and state did you go to? Open-Ended Response 
  
Which highways did you take? Please check all that 
apply. 
(These options varied 
between Florida, 
Georgia, and South 
Carolina, and an open 
response option was also 
provided.) 
On what date did you return to your home? Response 
 
Other (please specify the 
date) 
How much did you spend on evacuation related costs, 
in dollars? Please enter a whole number (no dollar 
sign or any other text). Open-Ended Response 
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How many pets evacuated with you? 
Dogs - Number 
evacuated 
 Cats - Number evacuated 
 
Other - Number 
evacuated 
What type of facility did you and your household stay 
in during your evacuation? Please check all that apply. Airbnb 
 
Church or place of 
worship 
 
Home of a friend or 
relative 
 Hotel or motel 
 
Pet-friendly hotel or 
motel 
 
Pet-friendly public 
shelter 
 
Public shelter (or Red 
Cross shelter) 
 Workplace 
 Other (please specify) 
Which factors influenced your decision to remain and 
not evacuate? Please check all that apply. Concern for pets 
 Concern for property 
 
Concern about where to 
stay 
 Cost of evacuation 
 Lack of transportation 
 Needed to work 
 Strength of hurricane 
 Storm path of hurricane 
 Traffic concerns 
 Other (please specify) 
Which of the following sources did you rely on for 
evacuation notices and storm updates and to what 
extent? Please rate each source. Internet 
 
Family, friends or 
neighbors 
 Local radio stations 
 Local television stations 
 
National news (e.g. Fox, 
CNN) 
 NOAA weather radio 
 Newspapers 
 Other TV cable stations 
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 Social media 
 Weather Channel 
Do you live in a hurricane evacuation zone? Response 
Is your home located in a FEMA flood zone? Response 
Including yourself, how many people live in your 
household? Response 
Of these people, how many people are under 18 - Number 
 over 65 - Number 
How many automobiles do you have in your 
household? Response 
How many pets do you have? Cats - Number 
 Dogs - Number 
 Other - Number 
During which months of the year do you most often 
stay at this address? Please check all that apply. Year round residence 
 January 
 February 
 March 
 April 
 May 
 June 
 July 
 August 
 September 
 October 
 November 
 December 
How long have you lived at this address, in years? Open-Ended Response 
Do you own or rent? Response 
Do you have a mortgage? 
Response (Y/N/Don’t 
know) 
Which of the following best describes the type 
of housing unit at this address? 
Detached single family 
home 
Apartment building or 
condominium, more than 
4 stories 
Apartment building or 
condominium, less than 4 
stories 
Duplex or other multi-
family structure 
Mobile home or 
manufactured housing 
 76 
 Other (please specify) 
When was the structure built? Please type in the year. Open-Ended Response 
How much damage did your home receive? None 
Slight 
Moderate 
Major 
Are you male or female? Response 
What is the highest grade you've completed? Response 
In what year were you born? Response 
Do you consider yourself to be Hispanic or Latino? Response (Y/N) 
What do you consider your racial background? Response 
 Other (please specify) 
Which of the following best describes your total 
household income in 2015? Response 
If you have a cell phone, are you registered 
with CodeRed Emergency Alerts system from 
SCEMD? 
Response (Y/N; South 
Carolina only) 
In your opinion, how do you rate the state's overall 
handling of the hurricane evacuation? 
Very poor 
Below average 
Average 
Above average 
Excellent 
Thank you for your responses.  If there is anything 
else you would like us to know about your evacuation 
experience or the state's management of the 
evacuation process, please provide any additional 
comments below. Open-Ended Response 
If you would like to be entered into a drawing to win 
an iPad Mini Wi-fi (16GB, $399 value), please enter 
your name and either your email address or your 
mailing address so that we may contact you if your 
number is selected.  Open-Ended Response 
 
